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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Of The Case

Nature

Justin

appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional guilty plea t0

On

murder and robbery.

ﬁrst degree

motion

Roy Booth

appeal,

Booth challenges the

district court’s denial

of his

to sever.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The

Proceedings

Booth and David Hutto murdered a random
2016. (PSI, pp.3-4.)

When

Kirk did not come

stranger,

William “Bo” Kirk, on October 22,

home from work that

charges appeared on his bank account, Kirk’s wife called police.

and When mysterious

night,

(Id., p.3.)

That same night,

police found Kirk’s abandoned and burned truck. (Id.)

Two
tied

nights later, Kirk’s

body was found

an embankment.

behind his back and he had been shot eight times.

On

His hands were zip

(Id.)

like, right

on us.”

(1d,,

Booth

(10/28/16 Tr.)1

driving together the night of October 22

“was,

(Id.)

October 28, Booth, his wife Heather Booth, and his attorney met with law

enforcement to give an interview.

his

in

p.27, L.4

—

when Kirk

p.29, L.1.)

driveway and that Hutto abducted Kirk

told police that he

purportedly tailgated them—Kirk’s truck

Booth told police

at gunpoint.

(Id.,

that they followed

p.30, L.17

—

p.32, L.10.)

explained that Hutto sat in the passenger seat of the Victim’s truck and forced

construction

1

The

site;

transcript

meanwhile, Booth drove his

own

and Hutto were

vehicle.

(Id.,

p.32, L.15

—

Kirk t0

Booth

him

to drive t0 a

p.34,

L3) Booth

of Booth’s interview With police appears in several places in the record on

284 of the
will be to the

appeal, including pages 25 through 120 of the Clerk’s Record, and pages 165 through

conﬁdential documents. For ease 0f reference, citations to the interview transcript

pages of the transcript

itself.

told police that Hutto then ordered Kirk out of his truck

at

Hutto’s behest.

traveled t0 an

“embankment,” but
got gas.”

the house and

(Id.,

—

p.35, L.19.)

at that point,

Booth

that

Booth frisked and zip

— p.55,

following Hutto’s instructions, he “went back t0

p.40, Ls.5-19.)

Booth

me

told police that Hutto “told

Halfway through the interview Booth changed

lie.

he had been “in the truck” with Hutto and Kirk—Kirk was

seat”

and Booth “was behind him.”

three of them stopped

[Kirk]”

(id.,

on the

(1d,,

p.55, L.22

side 0f the road

p.62, L.4

—

that after

he “reloaded

(id.,

—

his story;

(Id.,

p.56, L.25.)

Booth

now

he

sitting “in the

on

p.54,

admitted

passenger front

also admitted that the

p.59, Ls.14-22), and that “[Hutto]

Booth and Hutto

0n him”—shooting Kirk “ﬁve or

Booth then

p.63, L.12.)

it”

left

stated that Hutto

went and got

that

using Kirk’s ﬁnancial transaction cards.

bought gas, per Hutto’s request.

(1d,,

(Id.,

p.99, L.16

to

it

and

(Id.,

p.63, L.12

the gun, and

—

L.7.)

afﬁrmed

p.64, L.3; p.69, Ls.2-

—

two banks and withdrew money

p.78, L9.)

Booth also said

that

he

According to Booth they then abandoned
lit it

0n

ﬁre. (Id., p.92, L.24

Booth’s house and they burned their clothing in “a ﬁre

— p.100,

(Id.,

p.63, Ls.8—10; p.71, Ls.2-6.)

at least

p.77, L.1

p.89, Ls.1-5.)

Kirk’s truck, and Hutto poured gasoline inside

The two returned

(1d,,

he and Hutto drove to

six times” in the back.

“made me reload”

for Hutto, Hutto “shot again.”

Kirk “on the side of road.”

Booth told police

(1d,,

later

p.61, Ls.8-17). After telling Kirk, “‘Keep your eyes closed and you’ll see your wife

again,” Hutto “emptied the clip

3.)

Kirk

L.21.)

This was a

that

tied

also stated that the group eventually

he shot [Kirk],” but Booth “[did not] know” the circumstances of the shooting.

that

L.4

p.34, L.14

(Id.,

and

—

p.93, L.14.)

pit in the

backyard.”

The

state

charged Boothz by superseding indictment With ﬁrst degree murder, second

degree kidnapping, robbery, ﬁrst degree arson, and unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm.
pp.186-88.) Booth

moved

t0 sever the charges

presenting a duress defense.”

prejudiced should

trial

(R., p.459.)

because he would purportedly be “confounded in

According

to Booth,

he “could very well be

proceed,” because he purportedly had a duress defense to the non-murder

counts, but could be statutorily prohibited from presenting that defense t0 the

p.459; 4/12/18 Tr., p.33, L. 7

—

p.34, L.5 (citing Idaho

severance was justiﬁed because “he
“especially if” the statute prohibited

may

it

failed

0n the

merits.

(Id.,

Code

§ 18-201(4)).)

murder count.

Booth argued

(R.,

that

not wish to testify in relation to the Murder charges,

him from “presenting

L.25 — p.34, L.5.) The state objected, arguing
2) that

(R.,

p.37, L.5

1) that

—

motion 0n the merits and did not sever the counts.

a duress defense.” (4/12/18 T11, p.33,

Booth’s motion t0 sever was untimely, and

p.42, L.10.)

(1d,,

The

p.46, L.17

district court

— p.50,

denied Booth’s

L.14.)

Pursuant to a settlement agreement between the parties, Booth pleaded guilty to ﬁrstdegree murder and robbery, and the remaining counts were dismissed. (R., pp.486, 490-91, 495.)

Booth’s conditional plea reserved the “right t0 appeal the
motions, including, but not limited

p.488.)

p.535.)

2

The

district court

to,

the denial of the Defendant’s

sentenced Booth to concurrent

Booth timely appealed.

(Id.,

[district court’s] ruling[s]

life

Motion

0n

pretrial

to Sever.”

(Id.,

sentences, ﬁxing 30 years.

(Id.,

pp.544-46.)

murder (to which Hutto
entered an Alford plea) and ﬁrst degree kidnapping and robbery (t0 Which Hutto pleaded guilty);
the Idaho Court of Appeals afﬁrmed his judgment 0f conviction and sentence in an unpublished
opinion. State V. Hutto, 2018 WL 4140727, Docket No. 45 127 (ﬁled August 30, 2018).
Prior to charging Booth, the state charged Hutto with ﬁrst degree

ISSUES
Booth

Did

states the issue

the court abuse

0n appeal

its

as:

discretion in denying the

motion

t0 sever counts as

it

did

not give reasoned consideration to the prejudice Mr. Booth would suffer by

having t0 either choose t0

testify in support

0f his duress defense and incriminate

himself as t0 the murder count 0r not present that defense in order to remain
[silent] as to the

murder count?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Because Booth’s motion to sever was untimely, and because he has shown no good cause
excusing the delay, was

II.

In any event, has
sever, because

counts?

he

it

Booth
fails to

properly denied?

show the district court erred in denying his motion to
show any prejudice would have resulted from a trial on all the

failed t0

ARGUMENT
I.

Was Untimely And Booth Showed No Good Cause Or Excusable
To Justify The Delay; As Such, It Was Properly Denied

Booth’s Motion To Sever
Neglect

As
merits.

explained herein the district court correctly denied Booth’s motion t0 sever on the

However, denial was proper 0n another, threshold

untimely.3

And he has shown n0 good cause

is

move

for severance “[i]f

it

appears that a

prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in a complaint,

indictment, or information.”

But

parties

must comply with Idaho Criminal Rule

12(d),

which

Rule 12(b) motions—such as severance motions— “must be ﬁled Within 28 days

sets forth that

after the entry

12(b)(4), (d).

Booth’s motion was plainly

or excusable neglect to justify the delay.

Idaho Criminal Rule 14 allows parties to
defendant or the state

basis:

of a plea of not guilty 0r seven days before

While a court “may

trial

relieve a party of failure to

d0 so “for good cause shown 0r for excusable neglect.” I.C.R.

whichever

comply With

is earlier.”

this rule,”

it

I.C.R.

can only

12(d).

These timelines are not optional. Parties must show good cause or excusable neglect

to

properly ﬁle a Rule 12(b) motion; otherwise, “[a]llowing untimely [Rule 12(b)] motions t0 be

heard because they appear meritorious eviscerates the purpose 0f the rule.”

3

The

district court

merits.
this

(ﬂ

was an
(Ct.

Tr.,

went

straight to the

Dice (requiring courts to “determineﬂ whether good cause or

was shown based on

App. 1994). Alternatively,

implicit denial of

it

p.46, L.17 — p.50, L.14.) If the court overlooked the timeliness issue

error under State V.

excusable neglect

1104

did not address the state’s timeliness argument; instead,

4/12/18

State V. Dice, 126

the reasons given”).

was an
motion was

to the extent the district court’s merits consideration

the state’s timeliness

Booth

126 Idaho 595, 597, 887 P.2d 1102,

argument, this likewise was an error; the

good cause 0r excusable neglect, as explained
herein.
In any event, the state speciﬁcally argued that the motion to sever was untimely.
(4/12/18 Tr., p.39, Ls.3-16.) As such, “both the issue and the party’s position on the issue” were
unmistakably “raised before the trial court.” State V. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, _, 439 P.3d 1267,
1271 (2019). This issue is therefore “properly preserved for appeal” and the district court’s
ruling can be upheld on this basis. Li.
plainly untimely and

failed t0 establish

Idaho 595, 597, 887 P.2d 1102,

1104

(Ct.

Courts must therefore entertain

App. 1994).

explanations for the delay and must “determine[] whether good cause or excusable neglect

shown based on

the reasons given.” Li. “If n0

to the satisfaction

granted. Li.

of the

And where

district court,”

a

good cause 0r excusable neglect was established

was good cause or excusable neglect

for the late ﬁling,” a

motion

showing

Tarallo V. LaVallee, 433 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The exigencies 0f a

orderly procedure require that the motion t0 sever be

seems
trial.

to

be n0 reason

Why

appellant could not have

More than seven months

made

trial

for severance

(R., pp.398—99.)

1.)

this

trial,

ground before

and appellant

the state pointed out below,

on

May

His motion t0 sever was ﬁled nearly a year

22, 2017.

later,

on April

(R.,

11,

Booth’s motion did not even attempt t0 establish any good cause 0r

excusable neglect for the late ﬁling; indeed,

(E

As

guilty t0 the charges in the superseding indictment

p.223; 4/12/18 T11, p.39, Ls.3-1

2018.

0n

moment. There

began”).

Booth’s motion was plainly untimely under Rule 12(d).

Booth pleaded not

M

and the need for

trial

elapsed between appellant’s indictment and the

had counsel some time before the

that there

ﬂ alﬁ

at the earliest possible

moved

less

to sever is appropriately

denied. State V. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908, 55 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct. App. 2002);

rel.

much

a Rule 12(b) motion “should not [be] heard,”

record “is devoid of any evidence presented

trial

was

it

never mentioned the fact that

was time

it

barred.

id-)

Furthermore, Booth failed t0 establish good cause 0r excusable neglect
his motion.

fact that

The

state

at the

pointed out that the motion to sever was impermissibly

late,

hearing 0n

despite the

Booth’s then—counsel had “been 0n the case for six months now.” (4/12/18

Ls.3-16.) Booth’s counsel attempted, for the ﬁrst time, to confront the issue:

T11, p.39,

I

do Wish

requested

to address timeliness ﬁrst.

a—we’d

As

I

said, I

made

a record 0f that

we had

requested information related t0 statements given by Heather

Booth.

When

got the case in December,

I

received a response in

we

received a two page response.

March from an interview

that occurred in

We

then

October 0f 2016

that lasted approximately

an hour and 45 minutes with Ms. Booth. That interview

contains information that

we

At

we may

that point,

did not have that bolsters a duress defense.

not of

[sic]

had information

that

would have allowed a

duress defense t0 be presented and corroborated by another party other than my
client. That’s why this information was so crucial. That we could then—we—

Mr. Booth and Mrs. Booth have since divorced.

Ms. Booth has not been
So it was a crab
what was gonna be said should we subpoena her.
information that I could utilize t0 impeach her,

cooperative Without investigative efforts to
[sic] shoot, quite frankly, as t0

This interview then gave

me

make

statements.

should she testify t0 something different.

(Id.,

p.42, L.18

— p.43,

L.14.)

Booth’s counsel thought that “really the two people that could
actions, the threat

p.43, Ls.16-18.)

felt in

and the menace
Heather could

that

testify t0

he presented, were Heather Booth and Justin Booth.”

testify “as to [Hutto’s]

demeanor, as t0

how

the household, as to other various threats,” which, counsel thought,

duress defense.”

(Id.,

that transcript, our ability t0 truly present

(Id.,

uncomfortable she

was “the epitome of a

p.43, Ls.21-24.) Counsel further explained that “until

impeach Ms. Booth, have

Mr. Hutto’s

we had the

ability t0

and corroborate a duress

defense was very limited”:

So

as t0 timeliness, the ability t0 present a duress defense really

once

we were

now

I

can try to subpoena Ms. Booth.

Now

I

came

into focus

what we had. And
can impeach her if I need to, if she

able t0 get that transcript, review

it,

and

realize[]

testiﬁes t0 anything different.

(Id.,

p.43, L.25

0n the

state’s

—

p.44, L.13.)

In other words,

Booth blamed

his failure to timely

move

purported failure to timely disclose an interview transcript. This claim

for several reasons.

is

t0 sever

meritless

Booth’s argument

new

meritless, ﬁrst, because the interview transcript did not contain

any

information to the defense. Booth framed the interview as one “that occurred in October of

2016

that lasted approximately

an hour and 45 minutes With Ms. Booth.”

(1d,,

p.42, L.24

This half—correct account of the interview understates, beyond recognition, What

L.1.)

was:

is

it

was an interview of Booth himself

(ﬂ

present for portions 0f

to

have a panic

attack”)).

t0 hear” his admissions about the murder,

Booth knew exactly what

(ﬂ

sitting there.

he, his wife,

10/28/16 Tr.)

Thus,

we

counsel’s dog-ate-my—homework excuse that the “interview contains information that

reality.

(Id.,

knowledge of everything

actually

10/28/16 TL), which Heather happened to be

would not “want

everyone else said during his intervieW—he was

have” misstates

p.43,

10/28/16 Tr., p.56, Ls.2-8 (Where Heather was instructed t0 “step

outside” because Booth thought she

and because she was “going

(ﬂ

it

—

p.43, Ls.1-2.)

that

was

Long before Booth entered

said at his

own

interview.

As

his plea,

and
trial

did not

he had complete

such, Booth’s purported lack of

access t0 the transcript could not have conceivably justiﬁed his failure to timely ﬁle his motion to

sever.

Moreover, Booth
severance.

Booth argued

fails

t0

show Why

the interview transcript

that the transcript mattered

because

it

“gave

was even

me

could utilize to impeach [Heather], should she testify t0 something different.”

14.)

But

this

has zero bearing 0n the issue here: that Booth

himself would want t0

testify.

is

he

now

puts

it,

information that

(Id.,

I

p.43, Ls.12-

purportedly confounded because he

Booth could have taken the stand and testiﬁed about purported

duress regardless of whether he could have effectively impeached Heather.

true because, as

relevant t0

“Only Mr. Booth could

testify

This

is

especially

about the threats and menaces

the time [0f] the offenses because only he, Mr. Hutto, and the Victim

at

were present.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.9.)

Booth thus necessarily

impeaching information

(that

fails t0

show Why

the purportedly late disclosure 0f Heather-

he already knew about) prevented him from moving to sever.

This brings up the ﬁnal

ﬂaw

With Booth’s argument.

not establish below What Heather would have testiﬁed

less did

It is

entirely speculative.

Booth did

(10/28/16 TL, p.43, Ls.7-14.)

t0.

he establish that Heather would have contradicted her interview statements.

Booth’s counsel admitted that

it

was

all

guesswork:

What was gonna be said should we subpoena her.”

“it

was a crab

(Id.,

[sic] shoot,

p.32, Ls.8-14.)

Much

Instead,

quite frankly, as t0

Thus, even assuming

Heather-impeaching information would have been relevant to Booth’s duress defense, Booth
failed t0

State V.

make an

offer of proof that the interview actually

had any impeachment value.

E

Young, 136 Idaho 113, 120, 29 P.3d 949, 956 (2001) (“Error may not be based upon a

ruling that excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party

is

affected and the substance

0f the evidence was made known t0 the court by offer 0f proof”). This
the purportedly late receipt 0f the interview transcript prevented

fails t0

show, again,

why

Booth from timely moving

t0

sever the charges.

Booth’s only justiﬁcation for his untimely ﬁling was that he did not have access t0 a
transcript.

But

it

was a

transcript 0f an interview

he

sat through,

With only speculative

impeachment value, and with no new information 0r discernible relevance

t0

Booth’s

own

testimony. This falls far short 0f showing good cause or excusable neglect for Booth’s failure t0

move

to sever charges within

28 days 0f his not guilty plea.

was inexcusably untimely it was properly denied.

Because Booth’s motion

to sever

II.

Alternatively,

A.

Booth Fails T0 Show The District Court Erred BV Denying His Motion T0 Sever,
Because He Fails To Establish Facts Demonstrating AnV Preiudice

Introduction

In the alternative,

his severance

Booth

fails to

motion on the merits.

show

the district court abused

Booth contends

that the joinder

its

discretion

by denying

0f counts here prejudiced

him “because he may” have “Want[ed]

to assert his right t0

remain

case”—Where a duress defense would be

statutorily prohibited.

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) Despite

may have wanted

he claims he

that,

counts.

to testify in support

In other words, his purported “testimony in support of a duress defense to the non-

(Id.)

This argument

make

As

such,

Standard

Booth

standard.”

C.

fails to

show on

appeal,

In particular, he fails t0

fails t0

show

the district court erred in denying his motion t0 sever.

Of Review

A district court’s

Field,

because Booth failed to establish below, and

p.1 1.)

a convincing factual showing that he would have been confounded in presenting a duress

defense.

B.

fails

(Id.,

demonstrating he was prejudiced by the joinder of counts.

facts

murder

of a duress defense as t0 the other

homicide counts would confound his defense t0 the murder count.”

any

silent as t0 the

denial of a severance motion

is

reviewed under “an abuse 0f discretion

State V. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 760, 351 P.3d 1215, 1218 (2015); State V.

144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007).

Booth

Fails

Defenses

To

And

Establish Facts

Therefore Fails

Showing He Would Have Been Confounded In Presenting
To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion

T0 Sever
Motions

to sever are

governed by Idaho Criminal Rule

part:

10

14,

which provides

in relevant

If

it

appears that a defendant or the state

is

prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 0r

0f defendants in a complaint, indictment or information or by such joinder for
together, the court
trials

may

trial

order the state t0 elect between counts, grant separate

0f counts, grant a severance of defendants, 0r provide Whatever other relief

justice requires.

“When reviewing an

order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal

is

whether the

defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from a joint

Which denied the defendant a
(Ct.

The

App. 2002)

fair trial.”

trial,

State V. Egyilior, 137 Idaho 903, 901, 55 P.3d 896,

(citing State V. Cierelli, 115

908

Idaho 732, 734, 769 P.2d 609, 611 (Ct. App. 1989)).

been recognized by Idaho’s appellate courts

“potential sources of prejudice” that have

include:

(a) the possibility that the

jury

may confuse and cumulate the

keeping the evidence properly segregated;

(b) the potential that the

be confounded in presenting defenses; and
conclude the defendant

is

evidence, rather than

defendant

(c) the possibility that the jury

guilty of one crime

may
may

and then ﬁnd him or her guilty of
z'.e. he or she is a bad

the other simply because of his or her criminal disposition,

person.

Eggilior at 901, 55 P.3d at 908 (citation omitted).

Circuit case, further

“where he desires
not the other.”

States V. Foutz,

The

deﬁned how a defendant could be “confounded”

State V. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 867,

540 F.2d 733 (4th

state

is

this exact scenario:

II

in presenting defenses:

to assert his privilege against self—incrimination with respect t0

V.

one crime but

664 P.2d 772, 774 (1983) (quoting United

Cir. 1976)).

unaware 0f Idaho authority addressing

approvingly cites t0 Cross

0n Count

The Idaho Supreme Court, quoting a Fourth

this

United States, 335 F.2d 987, 990 (D.C.

precise issue.

Cir. 1964),

But Booth

Which examined

Where a defendant was confounded because he purportedly “Wished

and remain

silent

on Count

I.”

Li. at 990.

There, the defendant

“robbery of a tourist home” and “robbery of a church rectory,” respectively.

11

to testify

was charged with
Li. at 988.

Cross

wanted

t0 testify

on Count

home behind him.”

whereabouts

Li. at 990.

There, his defense

Li.

I.

because he had a highly convincing defense (that the jury ultimately

was a Victim and not a cohort 0f

believed) “that he

Count

II

On

the

armed robbers who entered the

the other hand, Cross

was

“that he

was not enthused about

tourist

testifying

had been drinking heavily and did not know

on
his

time of the church robbery.” Li. Deploying the heavy—drinking defense for

at the

the church robbery,

beyond being “plainly evasive and unconvincing,” led

questioning “concerning his generally tawdry

The Cross Court concluded

to

some

way 0f life and his prior convictions.”

that Cross

had been confounded

regrettable

Li.

in presenting a defense:

Thus it would appear that Cross had ample reason not t0 testify on Count I and
would not have done so if that count had been tried separately. In a separate trial
of that count the jury would not have heard his admissions of prior convictions
and unsavory activities; nor would he have been under duress to offer dubious
testimony on that count in order to avoid the damaging implication of testifying
on only one 0f the two joined counts.
Li. at

990—91.

Soon

after

Cross was issued, however, the D.C. Circuit clariﬁed that Cross had not

established an easily surmountable, defendant-driven test for prejudice.

States,

401 F.2d 958, 976-77 (D.C.

more than simply
prejudice.

Cir. 1968), the court

indicate a desire t0 testify

There, the appellant argued that

and bona ﬁde election by the accused

showing a mere election

explained that the defendant had to do

0n some counts, and stand

w

In Baker V. United

silent

on

others, t0

only required the defendant to show

t0 testify as to

some counts and not

t0 testify separately “requires a

(‘6

as t0 others,”

Rule 14 severance.’”

show

a timely

and

Li. at

that

976

(emphasis added).

The Baker Court sensibly
“Such a

rejected this reading of

rule,” the court ﬁrst noted,

its

prior opinion as “far too broad.” Li.

“would divest the court of

12

all

control over the matter of

severance and entrust

t0 the defendant.” Li. (footnote omitted).

it

The court acknowledged

“because of the unfavorable appearance of testifying 0n one charge while remaining
another, and the consequent pressure t0 testify as t0

with a dilemma: whether, by remaining

all

or none, the defendant

silent, t0 lose the

in respect

As

of testifying

is

dilemma

substantially the

same

exists

silent

on

confronted

beneﬁt 0f Vital testimony on one count,

rather than risk the prejudice (as t0 either or both counts) that

other.” Li. But, “[0]bviously[,]no such

may be

that

would

result

from

testifying

0n the

Where the balance 0f risk and advantage

as t0 each count.” Li.

such, the D.C. Circuit clariﬁed that the defendant

had the burden

to

prove potential

prejudice With a “convincing showing” 0f facts:

Thus unless the “election” referred to by appellant is t0 be regarded as
conclusive— and we think it should not be— n0 need for a severance exists until
the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony
t0 give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the
other.

Li. at

976-77 (footnote omitted). Moreover, t0 make a “convincing showing,”

the defendant present

“it is essential that

enough information—regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes

to

give 0n one count and his reasons for not Wishing t0 testify 0n the other—to satisfy the court that

the claim 0f prejudice

is

‘economy and expedition

genuine and to enable

it

intelligently t0

weigh the considerations 0f

in judicial administration’ against the defendant’s interest in

having a

free choice with respect t0 testifying.” Li. (footnote omitted).

Numerous
and

its

state

and federal courts have adopted the D.C. Circuit’s post-Cross reasoning

heightened “convincing showing” standard.

N.E.2d 481, 483 (Mass. App.

For example, in Com.

Ct. 1984), “the defendant did not present

V.

Williams, 467

any information”

at the

severance motion hearing “as to the nature of the testimony he proposed to give in the Marshﬁeld
case or any reason for desiring t0 remain silent in the

13

Pembroke

case.”

Instead, “defense counsel

only asserted that her client ‘might very well’ testify and that the defendant ‘can’t take the stand

0n
Li.

that

one [Marshﬁeld]

if it’s

This was insufﬁcient t0

going to cause a problem with the second incident [Pembroke].”’

show

prejudice insofar as “[t]hese representations were ephemeral

and did not meet the ‘convincing showing’ standard 0f Baker.” Li Courts relying 0n

“make a

similarly required defendants to

offered.”

2009);

ﬂ

United States

V.

particularized

have

showing of what testimony would be

Huff, N0. 2:08-CR-371, 2009

also United States V.

Ba_lccr

WL

Weber, 437 F.2d 327, 334 (3d

at

*3 (D. Utah Jan. 27,

Cir. 1970);

State V. Schroff, 503

197521,

A.2d 167, 169 (Conn. 1986) (holding the defendant “complete[1y]

fail[ed] to substantiate his

claim of prejudice” because “although the defendant did declare that he wanted to testify with
respect to the ﬁrst three counts but not

on the ﬁrearms counts, he

at

no time disclosed the

substance of his expected testimony, and he demonstrated no reason for his not wanting to testify

0n the other counts”); Holmes

V.

Gray, 526 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1975) (ﬁnding “severance

is

not mandatory every time a defendant Wishes to testify to one charge but to remain silent on
another”); United States V. Werner,

620 F.2d 922, 930 (2d

Cir.

1980); United States ex

rel.

Tarallo V. LaVallee, 433 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir.1970); United States V. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 191

(2d Cir. 2004).

Applying the foregoing heightened standards here, Booth has
court abused

there

is

its

discretion

When

it

failed to

show

the district

concluded that Booth failed t0 make “a sufﬁcient showing that

going t0 be a circumstance that will prejudice [him] in presenting his defense.” (4/12/18

Tr., p.49, Ls.20-23.)

(E R., pp.458—59.)

First,

Booth presented no evidence

in support

of his severance motion.

His notice 0f intent t0 seek a duress defense likewise alleged that Booth

“acted under the direct menace and threat 0f David Hutto,” but he never

showing” as

t0

what

threats

were issued, or how he was menaced.
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(Id.,

made

a “particularized

pp.398-99.)

Booth only discussed the

Similarly, at the hearing in support of his severance motion,

Booth only made the following statement

potential “duress defense” in the vaguest of terms.

regarding What duress, speciﬁcally, he was referring

As

to:

is aware in handling this case, the—really the two people that could
Mr. Hutto’s actions, the threat and the menace that he presented, were

the Court

testify to

Heather Booth and Justin Booth. They lived in

was

there

for

several

this tiny rental house.

Mr. Hutto

months. Ms. Booth testiﬁes—or, excuse me, makes

statements that as t0 his demeanor, as to

household, as t0 other various threats. That
information that will be utilized for

how

is

uncomfortable she

felt in

the

the epitome of a duress defense, the

that.

(4/12/18 Tr., p.43, Ls.15-25.)

Here again, oblique concern about prior “threat and menace,” or household discomfort,
does not establish that Booth was acting under duress the night of the murder.
particular

statement only establishes that Heather Booth purportedly

uncomfortable—not

that

Booth himself

showing” 0f Booth’s “strong need”

(E Q)

did.

t0 refrain

from

This

is

felt

Moreover,

this

and/or

threated

nowhere near a “convincing

testifying as t0 the

murder case or

he had

that

“important testimony t0 give” concerning duress for the other counts. Baker, 401 F.2d at 976-77.
Finally, Booth’s citation t0 the interview transcript, both

make

below and 0n appeal,

a convincing showing that Booth had a duress defense to give.

“the ability to present a duress defense really

transcript.”

(4/12/18 Tr., p.44, Ls.8—1

1.)

came

into focus

case are taken from the interview transcript.

fails, ﬁrst,

all

him

to

we were
that

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.1-2,

that

able to get that

“Mr. Booth had

of his purported

facts

0f the

8.)

because the interview transcript does not establish that Booth

had a legitimate duress defense. During the interview, Booth did not
the murder, Hutto forced

Below Booth argued

Booth similarly argues 0n appeal

important testimony to give concerning his duress defense,” and

This argument

once

fails t0

commit any 0f

15

the charged crimes.

state that,

(E

on the night of

10/28/16 Tr., pp.1-

120.)

On

appeal Booth points out that Hutto purportedly threatened Booth to “keep

shut,” or otherwise

the murder, kidnapping, robbery, or unlawful possession

Moreover,

(E

there.

who he

claimed to think were in danger.

(m

(Id.,

home

Booth therefore had ample opportunity

p.89, Ls.1-7.)

protect his family,

t0

p.89, Ls.1-2.)

t0

Here

too,

Booth did not

tried to reload the gun,

Even

threat

state that

ﬂee from Hutto and/or

p.89, Ls.1-4.)

id.,

load the

(Id.,

p.63,

Hutto threatened or coerced him—just that Hutto

was unsuccessful, “and

if this polite request to

Booth

ﬁnd Hutto was not

This leaves Booth’s statement that Hutto “made [Booth] reload” the gun.
Ls.10-12.)

commit

purported threat—like Hutto’s purported request that Booth “hurry” and get

the trip to get the gasoline for the arson alone, and returned

(Id.,

to

brief,

10/18/16 Tr., p.71, Ls.2-10.)

gasoline “0r else”—had, at best, minimal bearing 0n the arson charge.

made

shown duress

charges—because the purported

crimes had been committed.4

after all those

this

mouth

Booth would “stay here with” the recently—murdered Kirk. (Appellant’s

p.2 (citing 10/28/16 T11, p.71, Ls.4-10).) However, this could not have

happened

[his]

[Hutto] goes, ‘Reload this.”’

weapon would

qualify as duress,

it

(Id.,

p.64, Ls.1-3.)

would have only gone

towards the murder charge—not any 0f the other charges that Booth sought t0 sever in the ﬁrst
place.

Moreover, the interview transcript was unreliable. During the ﬁrst half 0f the interview

Booth supplied a ﬁctional
other things, that he

—

4

story.

was not

p.43, L.1; p.45, L.24

—

there

(E

id.,

p.32, L.5

When Hutto murdered

p.47, L.21; p.54, L.4

Likewise, Hutto’s purported threats to

entirety of the charged conduct;

—

kill

—

p.55,

p.55, L.21.)

Kirk.

(m

Booth maintained, among

id.,

p.40, Ls. 14-24; p.42, L.3

L21.) This was a

lie.

When Booth was

Booth’s wife 0r “whole family” happened after the

by chronological necessity these purported

caused Booth to commit any of the charged crimes under duress.
Ls.12-22; p.101, Ls.1-2; p.102, Ls.15-22.)
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threats could not

(E

have

10/28/16 Tr., p.100,

confronted by police, he admitted the truth: that he and Hutto murdered Kirk together.
Ls.2-8; p.62, L.14

—

p.63, L.12.)

While Booth’s new version of the

pull the trigger, but only loaded the

gun

at

Hutto’s behest

(id.,

the story eroded any stock one could place in the interview.

falsehoods that permeated the interview, Booth

it

were

much

credible,

fails to

less that they convincingly

show

facts

(Id.,

p.56,

claimed that he did not

p.67, Ls.4-13), this

new version of

In light of the shifting stories

that

any purported

facts

and

drawn from

showed he had important testimony

t0 give

about duress.
Lastly, the interview transcript only established that

could not have been genuine, and were in fact absurd.

demonstrate

many of Booth’s

This

is

“fears” of Hutto

one 0f many exchanges

that:

[Booth’s counsel]: This guy [Hutto]

is

junkyard mean.

[Ofﬁcer]: Okay.
[Booth]: Could

I

add something, please?

[Booth’s counsel]: Sure.

David Hutto says that he
them with 95 conﬁrmed kills.

[Booth]:
for

is

a Blackwater agent.

He

is

[Ofﬁcer]: Okay.

[Booth]:

He

[Heather]:

[Booth]:

acts very military.

He

He

is

is

He

acts very

very quiet.

very heavy, but fast and strong.

[Ofﬁcer]: Okay.

(1d.,

calm and very quick.

p.10, Ls.12—24.)
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a trained sniper

that

Needless to say, regardless 0f Whether Hutto was very calm, quick, quiet, heavy,
and/or strong, there

is

n0 credible evidence

in the record

agent” or a trained paramilitary sniper “With 95

stories

about Hutto’s “signature

kill

showing

conﬁrmed

that

kills.”

Hutto was “a Blackwater

(E R.)

the

tales

tall

about Hutto’s mercenary—commando double

falsehood that Booth “remember[ed] [Hutto] telling

later

admitted was

false.

(Id.,

And

Booth’s wild

mark” and “sniper crew” dealings were supplied

during his ﬁctional ﬁrst version 0f what took place that night. (10/28/16

particular,

me

that

fast,

to police

Tr., p.55, Ls.5-19.)

life

In

accompanied the

he had to reload”—which Booth
In sum, to the extent Booth’s

p.55, Ls.5-19; p.67, Ls.10-13.)

purported fears 0f Hutto were either based 0n ﬂights 0f fancy, or were packaged With his false
claims about What happened that night, those fears could not have been genuinely held.

Either

way, the interview transcript does not convincingly show that Booth had any important testimony
t0 give about

any purported duress he was under 0n the night of the murder.

Ba_ker,

401 F.2d

at

976-77.

“[S]everance

t0

remain

silent

is

not mandatory every time a defendant wishes to testify to one charge but

on another.”

m,

526 F.2d

at

626.

Furthermore, Booth failed to

make

a

convincing showing—either through an offer 0f proof or by reference t0 the interview
transcript—that he had a “strong need” to refrain from testifying as t0 the murder case or that

there

77.

was

the “important testimony t0 give concerning” the other counts. Ba_ker, 401 F.2d at 976-

Booth presented n0

show any

duress,

facts to support his motion, other than

undermined Booth’s

0f Hutto were unfounded. As a

make “a

credibility,

an interview transcript that did not

and revealed

that

result, the district court correctly

sufﬁcient showing that there

is

Booth’s generalized “fears”

concluded that Booth failed t0

going to be a circumstance that Will prejudice the

18

defendant in presenting his defense.” (4/12/18

Tr., p.49, Ls.20-23.)

Booth

fails t0

show

that this

was an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The
motion

state respectﬁllly requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

of Booth’s

t0 sever.

DATED this 20th day of August, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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